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Abstract
We present an automated veriﬁcation technique to verify trace based information ﬂow properties
for ﬁnite state systems. We show that the Basic Security Predicates (BSPs) deﬁned by Mantel in
[5], which are shown to be the building blocks of known trace based information ﬂow properties,
can be characterised in terms of regularity preserving language theoretic operations. This leads to
a decision procedure for checking whether a ﬁnite state system satisﬁes a given BSP. Veriﬁcation
techniques in the literature (e.g. unwinding) are based on the structure of the transition system
and are incomplete in some cases. In contrast, our technique is language based and complete for
all information ﬂow properties that can be expressed in terms of BSPs.
Keywords: information ﬂow control, veriﬁcation, ﬁnite state systems
1 Introduction
Granting, restricting and controlling the ﬂow of information is a core part of
computing system security. In particular, conﬁdential data needs to be pro-
tected from undesired accesses. Access control policies are deﬁned to serve
this task by specifying which accesses are allowed for which users. However,
access control methods can only restrict direct information ﬂow (over open
channels). Information leakage over covert channels (e.g. Trojan Horses, ob-
servable behaviour and time or space availability, etc) is not controllable by
access control methods.
In [4], Goguen and Meseguer ﬁrst introduced the notion ofNon-Interference
as a means to control both direct as well as indirect information ﬂow. Infor-
mally, Goguen and Meseguer distinguish between high level and low level users
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and describe non-interference as What one group of users does using a cer-
tain ability has no eﬀect on what some other group of users does [4]. More
precisely, their original notion of non-interference says that two systems (or
users) S1 and S2 are non-interfering if the output of S2 does not depend on
the input of S1.
Since Goguen and Meseguer’s initial work, many more deﬁnitions about
non-interference have been proposed in the literature. They all follow the
same principle of a low level entity not being able to infer too much informa-
tion about a high level user or high level activity in general. These security
properties include, among others, non-inference [10,9,12] (which requires that
each system behavior projected to low level behavior is itself a possible be-
havior), separability [9] (which requires that every possible low level behavior
interleaved with every possible high level behaviour must be a possible be-
haviour of a system), generalized non-interference [8] (which requires that for
every possible trace and every possible perturbation there is a correction to
the perturbation such that the resulting trace is again a possible trace of the
system), nondeducability [11], restrictiveness [8], the perfect security property
[12], and many more.
Though all these properties follow the main idea of ensuring, that informa-
tion is not leaked from high level users to low level users, they diﬀer in their
strictness as well as in the type of system they are deﬁned for.
In [7,5] Mantel has presented an approach to uniformly formalize all known
trace based information ﬂow properties. Based on sets of traces as the sys-
tem model, Mantel has deﬁned a set of basic security predicates (BSPs). He
shows that all known trace based security properties can be represented as
conjunctions of these BSPs. For example generalized noninterference can be
deﬁned as the conjunction of the two BSPs insertion (I) and deletion (D). A
set of traces L satisﬁes the BSP I if for every perturbation of a trace that
is obtained by inserting a conﬁdential event after the last conﬁdential event,
there exists a correction of this perturbation obtained by inserting or deleting
certain non-conﬁdential events, such that the resulting trace is also in the lan-
guage L. A set of traces L satisﬁes the BSP D if for every perturbation that is
obtained by deleting the last conﬁdential event, there exists a correction of this
perturbation that is obtained by inserting or deleting certain non-conﬁdential
events, such that the resulting trace is also in the language L.
Our work is based on the modular framework presented in [5]. We present
an automated veriﬁcation technique to check whether a ﬁnite state system
satisﬁes a given basic security predicate. Our approach is language based
rather than structure based. We deﬁne a set of language theoretic operations
and show that the question of whether a set of traces L satisﬁes a BSP P
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boils down to checking whether a language L1 is contained in a language L2,
where L1 and L2 are obtained from L by successive applications of the deﬁned
language-theoretic operations. Finally we show that the language-theoretic
operations are regularity preserving, and eﬀectively so. Thus if L is speciﬁed
by a ﬁnite state transition system (and is hence regular), then L1 and L2 are
also regular and the question of whether L1 ⊆ L2 can be answered eﬀectively.
As has been observed earlier, the BSPs are properties of sets of traces
rather than properties of traces and hence cannot be handled by classical
model checking approaches. Nonetheless, our work gives a method to “model
check” these properties by reducing them to the language inclusion problem
for ﬁnite state systems.
Previous work dealing with the veriﬁcation of trace based security prop-
erties (e.g.[6,1,3]) mainly employ unwinding theorems as veriﬁcation tech-
nique for information ﬂow properties. These techniques are typically suﬃcient
though not necessary in all cases. We feel that this may be due to the fact
that unwinding relations are based on the structure of the system rather than
on the language of traces generated by the system. The only other work we
are aware of which gives a decision procedure based on language inclusion
is [2]. While they have addressed the properties of non-deterministic nonin-
terference and strong non-deterministic noninterference (which is equivalent
to the deﬁnition of noninference given in [9] and [10]), our approach gives a
decision procedure for the whole class of information ﬂow properties that can
be expressed in terms of BSPs.
2 Language-Theoretic Operations
By an alphabet we will mean a ﬁnite set of symbols representing events or
actions of a system. For an alphabet Σ we use Σ∗ to denote the set of ﬁnite
strings over Σ. The null or empty string is represented by the symbol . For
two strings α and β in Σ∗ we write αβ for the concatenation of α and β. A
language L over Σ is just a subset of Σ∗.
A marked language M over an alphabet Σ is a language over the alphabet
Σ ∪ {}, where ‘’ is a special “mark” symbol diﬀerent from those in Σ, and
each string in M contains exactly one occurence of .
For the rest of the paper we ﬁx an alphabet of events Σ. We assume
a partition of Σ into V, C,N , which in the framework of [5] correspond to
events that are visible, conﬁdential, and neither visible nor conﬁdential, from
a particular user’s point of view.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Language-theoretic operations) Let L be a language over
Σ modelling sets of possible traces of a system and let M be a marked language
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over Σ. Let X be a subset of Σ.
We deﬁne the following language-theoretic operations on L:
(i) L X := {τ X | τ ∈ L}, where τ X is obtained from τ by deleting all
events from τ that are not elements of X.
(ii) l-del(L) := {αβ | αcβ ∈ L, β C= }.
Operation l-del corresponds to the deletion of the last conﬁdential event in
a string. More precisely, this operation deletes the last occuring C-event
from every string in L.
(iii) l-ins(L) := {αcβ | αβ ∈ L, β C= , c ∈ C}.
Operation l-ins corresponds to the insertion of conﬁdential events in strings
of L. More precisely, l-ins contains all strings γ ∈ Σ∗ obtained by insert-
ing a C-event in a string τ ∈ L, in a position after which no C-events
occur.
(iv) l-ins-admX(L) :=
{αcβ | αβ ∈ L, β C= , there exists γc ∈ L, γ X= αX , c ∈ C}.
Operation l-ins-admX corresponds to admissible insertion of conﬁdential
events in strings of L. More precisely, this operation is similar to l-ins
but allows only the insertion of admissible C-events. The insertion of
an event c ∈ C is admissible after a preﬁx α in a string τ iﬀ there exists
another string γc ∈ L with γ projected to the set X being equal to α
projected to X.
(v) l-del-mark(L) := {αβ | αcβ ∈ L, β C= }.
Operation l-del-mark corresponds to marked deletion of the last conﬁden-
tial event. More precisely, this operation replaces the last event c ∈ C in
every string of L by the special mark symbol .
(vi) l-ins-mark(L) := {αcβ | αβ ∈ L, β C= , c ∈ C}.
Operation l-ins-mark corresponds to marked insertion of a conﬁdential
event. This operation is similar to l-ins, but additionally introduces a
mark  after the newly inserted symbol.
(vii) l-ins-adm-markX(L) :=
{αcβ | αβ ∈ L, β C= , there exists γc ∈ L, γ X= αX , c ∈ C}.
Operation l-ins-adm-markX corresponds to marked insertion of admissible
events. More precisely, this operation is similar to l-ins-admX, but a mark
 is introduced after the newly inserted (admissible) symbol c in the string.
(viii) mark(L) := {αβ | αβ ∈ L}.
Operation mark corresponds to the insertion of a mark at an arbitrary
position. More precisely mark contains all strings which can be obtained
by the insertion of the mark symbol in an arbitrary position of a string
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in L.
(ix) M mX := {αβ
′ | αβ ∈ L, β ′ = β X}.
This operation corresponds to a marked projection. More precisely, this
operates on a marked language M and is similar to Projection, but leaves
every string intact upto the mark and projects to set X the suﬃx after
the mark.
(x) Let C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ ⊆ V .
l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L) := {αvβ |αcvβ ∈ L, β C= , c ∈ C
′, v ∈ V ′}.
Operation l-del-con-mark corresponds to marked deletion in the “context”
of an event in V ′. More precisely, this operation replaces the last conﬁ-
dential event c in a string by the mark symbol, provided c belongs to C ′
and and is immediately followed by a V ′ event in the string.
(xi) Let C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ ⊆ V .
l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L) := {αcvβ | αvβ ∈ L, β C= , c ∈ C
′, v ∈ V ′}.
Operation l-ins-con-mark corresponds to marked insertion in the context
of a V ′ event. More precisely, l-ins-con-mark contains all strings obtained
by inserting a C ′ event at a point in a string after which no conﬁdential
events occur and which is immediately followed by a V ′ event v; the mark
symbol is also inserted after the event v.
(xii) Let C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ ⊆ V .
l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L) :=
{αcvβ | αvβ ∈ L, β C= , there exists γc ∈ L, γ X= α X , c ∈
C ′, v ∈ V ′}.
Operation l-ins-adm-con-markX corresponds to the marked insertion of
admissible events in the context of a V ′ event. This operation is similar
to l-ins-con-mark but allows only the insertion of admissible C-symbols,
where admissibility is deﬁned as for operation l-ins-admX.
(xiii) Let N ′ ⊆ N and V ′ ⊆ V .
erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) := {αvβ | αδvβ ∈ L, δ ∈ (N
′)∗, v ∈ V ′}.
Operation erase-con-mark corresponds to the marked erasure of N ′-events.
More precisely, erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) contains all strings obtained from
a string in L by the erasure of a consecutive sequence of N ′ events which
end before a V ′ event v. The mark symbol is also inserted after the event
v in the string.
3 Expressing BSP’s Language-Theoretically
We now express the basic security predicates (BSPs) of Mantel in terms of the
language-theoretic operations just deﬁned, and the usual subset relation.
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In this work we use a notion of “equality upto corrections of a set Y”.
For convenience, we thus introduce the following notations, where Y denotes
Σ− Y .
• α =Y β iﬀ α Y = β Y¯ . String α is equal to β upto corrections on Y -events
iﬀ the projection of α on Y is equal to the projection of β on Y .
• α ∈Y L iﬀ there exists β ∈ L such that α =Y β. A string α belongs to L
upto corrections on Y -events iﬀ L contains a string β that equals α upto
corrections on Y .
• L ⊆Y M iﬀ for all strings α ∈ L we have α ∈Y M . L is a subset of M upto
corrections on Y iﬀ every element of L belongs to M upto corrections on Y .
Recall, that we deﬁned a partition of the set Σ into V, C and N .
Deﬁnition 3.1 (R) A language L satisﬁes property R (Removal of events)
iﬀ for all strings τ ∈ L there exists a string τ ′ ∈ L such that τ ′ does not
contain any C-symbols and τ ′ V = τ V .
Lemma 3.2 Property R is satisﬁed by a language L iﬀ LV⊆N L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that L satisﬁes property R. Consider any string τ
in L V . (Note, that all symbols in τ belong to set V .) By deﬁnition of the
projection LV , there must exist some string τ
′ ∈ L such that τ ′ V = τ . Since
property R is satisﬁed by language L, there must exist a string τ ′′ in L that
does not contain any C-symbols and whose projection τ ′′ V is equal to the
projection τ ′ V . Thus string τ
′′ diﬀers from τ with only N -symbols and τ
belongs to language L modulo corrections of N (τ ∈N L). Hence LV⊆N L.
⇐: Let us assume that LV⊆N L. Consider any string τ ∈ L. Obviously,
the projection τ V belongs to LV . Since LV⊆N L, there must exist a string
τ ′ ∈ L that is equivalent to the projection τV upto corrections of N -symbols
and, moreover, does not contain any C-symbols. Thus, τ ′ V = τ V . Hence R
is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.3 (D) Language L satisﬁes property D (Stepwise Deletion of
events) iﬀ for each string αcβ ∈ L, where c ∈ C and the projection β C on
C-events is empty, we have a string α′β ′ ∈ L such that α′ V ∪C= α V ∪C and
β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
Lemma 3.4 Property D is satisﬁed by a language L iﬀ l-del(L) ⊆N L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property P is satisﬁed by language L. Consider
a string τ ∈ l-del(L). This string will be of the form αβ where by deﬁnition
of l-del(L) β does not contain any C-symbols and the string αcβ belongs to L
for some symbol c ∈ C. Since D is satisﬁed, there must exist a string α′β ′ ∈ L
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such that α′ V ∪C= αV ∪C and β
′ V ∪C= β V ∪C . Thus string τ(= αβ) belongs
to L upto corrections of N -symbols. Hence l-del(L) ⊆N L.
⇐: Let us assume that l-del(L) ⊆N L. Consider a string τ ∈ L that is of
the form αcβ where β does not contain any C-symbols. By the deﬁnition of
the language l-del(L), the string αβ belongs to l-del(L). Since l-del(L) ⊆N L,
there must exist a string τ ′ ∈ L such that αβ and τ ′ are equivalent upto
corrections of N -symbols. Hence D is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.5 (I) Language L satisﬁes property I (Insertion of events) iﬀ
for all strings αβ ∈ L where β does not contain any C events and for all c ∈ C,
we have α′cβ ′ ∈ L, for some string β ′ with β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C , α
′ V ∪C= αV ∪C.
Lemma 3.6 Property I is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-ins(L) ⊆N L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property I is satisﬁed. Consider a string τ in
language l-ins(L). By deﬁnition of l-ins(L), the string τ will be of the form
αcβ, where c belongs to set C, αβ belongs to L and β does not contain any
C-symbols. Since property I is satisﬁed by language L, there must exist a
string α′cβ ′ in L such that α′ V ∪C= αV ∪C and β
′ V ∪C= β V ∪C . Thus string
τ (= αcβ) belongs to L upto corrections of N -symbols. Hence l-ins(L) ⊆N L.
⇐: Let us assume that l-ins(L) ⊆N L. Consider a string τ ∈ L of the form
αβ, where β does not contain any C-events. By the deﬁnition of l-ins(L), there
exists a string αcβ ∈ l-ins(L) for each c ∈ C. Since l-ins(L) ⊆N L, we have
that αcβ ∈N L. This means that there must exist a string α
′cβ ′ in L where
α and α′ as well as β and β ′ are equivalent upto corrections of N -symbols,
i.e. α′ V ∪C= αV ∪C and β
′ V ∪C= β V ∪C . Hence I is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.7 (IAX) A language L satisﬁes the property IAX (Insertion of
X-admissible events) iﬀ for every string αβ ∈ L such that β does not contain
any C-symbols and there exists a string γc ∈ L for some c ∈ C with γ X=
α X, we have that αcβ ∈N L, i.e. αcβ belongs to L upto corrections on N-
symbols.
Lemma 3.8 Property IAX is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-ins-admX(L) ⊆N L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property IAX is satisﬁed by language L. Con-
sider any string τ in l-ins-admX(L). By deﬁnition of l-ins-admX(L), this
string τ will be of the form αcβ for some symbol c ∈ C such that the follow-
ing conditions hold: The string αβ belongs to L and for some string γ with
γ X= αX , the string γc belongs to L as well. Since IA
X is satisﬁed, we have
that αcβ ∈N L, i.e. αcβ belongs to L upto corrections of N -symbols. Hence
l-ins-admX(L) ⊆N L.
⇐: Let us assume that l-ins-admX(L) ⊆N L. Consider any string αβ ∈ L
that satisﬁes the following conditions: the substring β does not contain any
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C-symbols and there exists a string γc ∈ L for some C-symbol such that γ X=
αX. By deﬁnition of l-ins-adm
X(L) the string αcβ belongs to l-ins-admX(L).
Since l-ins-admX(L) ⊆N L, we have that the string αcβ belongs to L upto
corrections on N -symbols, i.e. αcβ ∈N L.Hence IA
X is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.9 (BSD) L satisﬁes BSD (Backwards Strict Deletion) iﬀ for
every string αcβ ∈ L where c ∈ C and the substring β does not contain any
C-events there exists a string αβ ′ ∈ L with β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
Lemma 3.10 Property BSD is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-del-mark(L)m
N
⊆
mark(L)m
N
.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property BSD is satisﬁed by language L.
Consider any string τ ∈ l-del-mark(L)m
N
. This string will be of the form αβ
where β does not contain any N -symbol. By deﬁnition of marked projection,
there must exist a string αβ ′ ∈ l-del-mark(L) with β ′ N= β N . By deﬁnition
of l-del-mark(L), there must exist a symbol c ∈ C such that αcβ ′ belongs to
L. Since the property BSD is satisﬁed, there also exists a string αβ ′′ ∈ L,
such that β N= β
′′N . By deﬁnition of mark(L), we have that αβ
′′ ∈
mark(L). Since β does not contain any N -symbols and β and β ′′ are equal
upto corrections on N -symols, we have that β is equivalent to β ′′ with all
N -symbols deleted, which means, that αβ belongs to mark(L) m
N
Hence
l-del-mark(L)m
N
⊆ mark(L)m
N
.
⇐: Let us assume that l-del-mark(L) m
N
⊆ mark(L) m
N
. Consider any
string αcβ ∈ L, where c ∈ C and β does not contain any C-events. By the
deﬁnition of l-del-mark(L), the marked string αβ belongs to l-del-mark(L).
By the deﬁnition of marked projection, there exists αβ ′ ∈ l-del-mark(L) m
N
where β ′ is equal to β with N -symbols deleted. Since l-del-mark(L) m
N
⊆
mark(L) m
N
, the marked string αβ ′ belongs to mark(L) m
N
as well. By the
deﬁnition of marked projection, there must exists a marked string αβ ′′ ∈
mark(L) for some β ′′ with β ′′ N= β
′. Note, that the substring β ′′ is equal
to β upto corrections of N -symbols. By the deﬁnition of mark(L), the string
αβ ′′ also belongs to L. Hence BSD is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.11 (BSI ) L satisﬁes BSI (Backwards Strict Insertion) iﬀ for
all strings αβ ∈ L where β does not contain any C-symbols and for all symbols
c ∈ C, we have αcβ ′ ∈ L for some string β ′ with β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
Lemma 3.12 Property BSI is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-ins-mark(L) m
N
⊆
mark(L)m
N
.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that BSI is satisﬁed by language L. Consider any
string τ ∈ l-ins-mark(L)m
N
. This string will be of the form αcβ where c ∈ C
and β contains only V -symbols. By the deﬁnition of marked projection, there
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must exist a string αcβ ′ in l-ins-mark(L), such that β ′ does not contain any
C-symbols and is equal to β on V -symbols. By the deﬁnition of l-ins-mark(L),
the string αβ ′ must belong to language L. Since property BSI is satisﬁed by
language L, for every symbol c ∈ C there must exist a string β ′′ with β ′′ V ∪C
β ′, such that αcβ ′′ belongs to L. According to the deﬁnition of mark(L), αcβ
belongs to mark(L). Since β ′′ is equal to β after deleting all N -symbols, we
have that αcβ belongs to mark(L)m
N
. Hence l-ins-mark(L)m
N
⊆ mark(L)m
N
.
⇐: Let us assume that l-ins-mark(L) m
N
⊆ mark(L) m
N
. Consider a string
τ ∈ L of the form αβ where β does not contain any C-symbols. By the
deﬁnition of l-ins-mark(L), there string αcβ belongs to l-ins-mark(L) for
every c ∈ C. By the deﬁnition of marked projection, there exists αcβ ′ ∈
l-ins-mark(L) m
N
where β ′ is equal to β with all N -symbols deleted. Since
l-ins-mark(L)m
N
⊆ mark(L)m
N
, the string αcβ ′ also belongs to mark(L)m
N
.
By the deﬁnition of marked projection, there must exist a string αcβ ′′ ∈
mark(L) for some β ′′ such that β ′′ N= β
′. Note, that β ′′ is equivalent to β
upto corrections of N -symbols. By the deﬁnition of mark(L), the string αcβ ′′
belongs to L. Hence BSI is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.13 (BSIAX) Language L satisﬁes property BSIAX (Backwards
Strict Insertion of X-admissible events) iﬀ for all strings αβ ∈ L where β
does not contain any C-events and for which there exists a string γc ∈ L with
c ∈ C and γ X= αX, we have αcβ
′ ∈ L for some β ′ with β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
Lemma 3.14 Property BSIAX is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ
l-ins-adm-markX(L)m
N
⊆ mark(L)m
N
.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property BSIAX is satisﬁed by language
L. Consider any string τ ∈ l-ins-adm-markX(L) m
N
. This string τ will
be of the form αcβ, where c ∈ C and β contains only V -symbols. Ac-
cording to the deﬁnition of marked projection, there must exist a string
αcβ′ ∈ l-ins-adm-markX(L), such that β ′ does not contain any C-symbols
and is equal to β on V -symbols. By deﬁnition of l-ins-adm-markX(L), the
string αβ belongs to L and there exists a string γc ∈ L with γ X= α X .
Since BSIAX is satisﬁed, there exists a string αcβ ′′ ∈ L for some string β ′′
with β and β ′′ being equivalent upto corrections of N -symbols. By deﬁnition
of mark(L), the string αcβ ′′ belongs to mark(L). Since β ′′ is equal to β after
deleting all N -symbols, we have that αcβ belongs to mark(L) m
N
. Hence
l-ins-adm-markX(L)m
N
⊆ mark(L)m
N
.
⇐: Let us assume that l-ins-adm-markX(L) m
N
⊆ mark(L) m
N
. Consider
any string αβ ∈ L where β does not contain any C-symbols and there exists
a string γc ∈ L for some c ∈ C such that γ X= α X . By the deﬁnition of
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l-ins-adm-markX(L), the string αcβ belongs to l-ins-adm-markX(L). By deﬁ-
nition of marked projection, the string αcβ ′ belongs to l-ins-adm-markX(L)m
N
where β ′ is equal to β with N -symbols deleted. Since l-ins-adm-markX(L)m
N
⊆ mark(L) m
N
, the string αcβ ′ also belongs to mark(L) m
N
. Again by
the deﬁniton of marked projection, there must exist a string β ′′, such that
αcβ ′′ ∈ mark(L) and β ′′ N= β
′. Note, that β ′′ is equivalent to β upto cor-
rections of N -symbols. Thus, by the deﬁnition of mark(L), the string αcβ ′′
belongs to language L. Hence BSIAX is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.15 (FCD) Language L satisﬁes property FCD (Forward Cor-
rectable Deletion) iﬀ for all strings αcvβ ∈ L where c ∈ C ′, v ∈ V ′ and where
β does not contain any C-symbols we have αδvβ ′ ∈ L with β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
Lemma 3.16 Property FCD is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ
l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property FCD is satisﬁed by language L.
Consider a string τ in l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L). τ can be expressed as αvβ
where αcvβ ∈ L, c ∈ C ′, v ∈ V ′ with β C= . There exists αvβ
′ ∈
l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
, where β ′ is β with N -symbols deleted. Since FCD is
satisﬁed by L, there exists αδvβ ′′ ∈ L where β ′′ and β are equivalent upto cor-
rections of N -symbols, with δ ∈ (N ′)∗ By deﬁnition of erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L),
there exists αvβ ′′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L). Deleting N -symbols from β
′′ re-
sults in β ′. So, αvβ ′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
Hence l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
⇐: Let’s assume that l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
Consider any string αcvβ ∈ L, where c ∈ C ′, v ∈ V ′ and where β does not con-
tain any C-symbols. By the deﬁnition of l-del-con-markC′,N ′(L), there exists
αvβ ∈ l-del-con-markC′,N ′(L). By the deﬁnition of Marked Projection, there
exists αvβ ′ ∈ l-del-con-markC′,N ′(L)
m
N
with β ′ = β N . From the assumption
l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) 
m
N
it follows that αvβ ′ ∈
erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
. There exists αvβ ′′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) where
β ′′ N= β
′. By the deﬁnition of erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L), there exists αδvβ
′′ ∈ L
with δ ∈ (N ′)∗. Note, that the strings β and β ′′ are equivalent upto correction
of N -symbols. This proves that FCD is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.17 (FCI ) A language L satisﬁes a property FCI (Forward Cor-
rectable Insertion) iﬀ for all αvβ ∈ L with v ∈ V ′ and where β does not con-
tain any C-symbols, we have αcδvβ ′ ∈ L, for every c ∈ C ′ with δ ∈ (N ′)∗ and
β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
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Lemma 3.18 Property FCI is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ
l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property FCI is satisﬁed by language L.
Consider a string τ ∈ l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L). τ can be expressed as αcvβ,
c ∈ C ′, v ∈ V ′ with αvβ ∈ L and β C= . If we let β
′ denote β with
N -symbols deleted, then there exists αcvβ ′ ∈ l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
.
Since FCI is satisﬁed by L, there exists αcδvβ ′′ ∈ L with δ ∈ (N ′)∗ and
β ′′ V ∪C= β V ∪C . There exists αcvβ
′′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L). Deleting N -
symbols from β ′′ results in β ′. So, αcvβ ′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
. Hence
l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
⇐: Assume that l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) 
m
N
.
Consider a string τ ∈ L of the form αvβ, vinV ′ with β C= . By the deﬁnition
of l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L), there exists αcvβ ∈ l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L), c ∈ C
′.
There exists αcvβ ′ ∈ l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
with β ′ is β with N -symbols
deleted. Since l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
, αcvβ ′ ∈
erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) 
m
N
. There exists αcvβ ′′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
where β ′′ N= β
′. β ′′ and β are equivalent upto corrections of N -symbols.
By the deﬁnition of erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L), there exists αcδvβ
′′ ∈ L. Hence
FCI is satisﬁed. 
q
Deﬁnition 3.19 (FCIAX) L satisﬁes FCIAX(Forward Correctable Insertion
of X-admissible events) iﬀ for all αvβ ∈ L, v ∈ V ′ with β C=  and there
exists γc ∈ L, c ∈ C ′ with γ X= α X, we have αcδvβ
′ ∈ L with δ ∈ (N ′)∗
and β ′ V ∪C= β V ∪C.
Lemma 3.20 Property FCIAX is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ
l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
Proof. ⇒: Assume that property FCIAX is satisﬁed by language L. Con-
sider a string τ ∈ l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L). τ can be expressed as αcvβ,
c ∈ C ′, v ∈ V ′ with αvβ ∈ L and β C=  such that there exists γc ∈ L
with γ X= α X . There exists αcvβ
′ ∈ l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
where
β ′ is β with N -symbols deleted. Since FCIAX is satisﬁed by L, there ex-
ists αcδvβ ′′ ∈ L with δ ∈ (N ′)∗ and β ′′ V ∪C= β V ∪C . By the deﬁnition
of erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L), αcvβ
′′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L). Deleting N -
symbols from β ′′ results in β ′. So, αcvβ ′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
. Hence
l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
⇐: Assume that l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L)
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
m
N
.
Consider a string τ ∈ L of the form αvβ, vinV ′ with β C=  such that there ex-
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ists γc ∈ L with γ X= αX . By the deﬁnition of l-ins-adm-con-mark
X
C′,V ′(L),
there exists αcvβ ∈ l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L), c ∈ C
′. There exists αcvβ ′ ∈
l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
with β ′ is β with N -symbols deleted. Us-
ing l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L) 
m
N
⊆ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) 
m
N
we conclude
that αcvβ ′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L) 
m
N
. If β ′′ N= β
′, then there exists
αcvβ ′′ ∈ erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L). Then β
′′ and β are equivalent upto correc-
tions of N -symbols. By the deﬁnition of erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L), there exists
αcδvβ ′′ ∈ L. Hence FCIAX is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.21 (SR) Language L satisﬁes property SR (Strict Removal) iﬀ
for all τ ∈ L we have τ C∈ L.
Lemma 3.22 Property SR is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ LC⊆ L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property SR is satisﬁed by language L. Con-
sider any string τ in LC . By the deﬁnition of projection, there exists τ
′ in L
such that τ ′ C= τ . Since SR is satisﬁed by L, τ = τ
′ C∈ L. Hence LC⊆ L.
⇐: Let us assume that L C⊆ L. Consider any string τ in L. τ C∈ L C .
Since LC⊆ L, τ C∈ L. Hence SR is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.23 (SD) Language L satisﬁes property SD (Strict Deletion) iﬀ
for all αcβ ∈ L, c ∈ C such that β C= , we have αβ ∈ L.
Lemma 3.24 Property SD is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-del(L) ⊆ L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property SD is satisﬁed by language L. Con-
sider a string τ in l-del(L). τ can be expressed as αβ with β C=  and
αcβ ∈ L for some c ∈ C. Since SD is satisﬁed by L, there exists αβ ∈ L.
Hence l-del(L) ⊆ L.
⇐: Let us assume that l-del(L) ⊆ L. Consider a string τ of the form
αcβ ∈ L, c ∈ C. By the deﬁnition of l-del(L), there exists αβ ∈ l-del(L).
Since l-del(L) ⊆ L, αβ ∈ L. Hence SD is satisﬁed. 
Deﬁnition 3.25 (SI ) Language L satisﬁes property SI (Strict Insertion) iﬀ
for all αβ ∈ L such that β C= , we have αcβ ∈ L, for every c ∈ C.
Lemma 3.26 Property SI is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-ins(L) ⊆ L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property SI is satisﬁed by language L. Con-
sider a string τ ∈ L. τ can be expressed as αcβ, c ∈ C such that β C=  with
αβ ∈ L. Since SI is satisﬁed by L, there exists αcβ ∈ L. Hence l-ins(L) ⊆ L.
⇐: Let us assume that l-ins(L) ⊆ L. Consider a string τ ∈ L of the form
αβ such that β C= . By the deﬁnition of l-ins(L), there exists αcβ ∈ l-ins(L)
for any c ∈ C. Since l-ins(L) ⊆ L, αcβ ∈ L. Hence SI is satisﬁed. 
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Deﬁnition 3.27 (SIAX) Language L satisﬁes property SIAX (Strict Inser-
tion of X-admissible events) iﬀ for all αβ ∈ L such that β C=  and there
exists γc ∈ L, c ∈ C with γ X= αX, we have αcβ ∈ L.
Lemma 3.28 Property SIAX is satisﬁed by language L iﬀ l-ins-admX(L) ⊆
L.
Proof. ⇒: Let us assume that property SIAX is satisﬁed by language L.
Consider a string τ ∈ l-ins-admX(L). τ can be expressed as αcβ with β C= 
such that there exists γc ∈ L, c ∈ C with γ X= αX . Since SIA
X is satisﬁed
by L, there exists τ = αcβ ∈ L. Hence l-ins-admX(L) ⊆ L.
⇐: Let us assume that l-ins-admX(L) ⊆ L. Consider a string τ ∈ L
of the form αβ with β C=  such that there exists γc ∈ L, c ∈ C with
γ X= α X . By the deﬁnition of l-ins-adm
X(L), τ ∈ l-ins-admX(L). Since
l-ins-admX(L) ⊆ L, αcβ ∈ L. Hence SIAX is satisﬁed. 
4 Operations are Regularity Preserving
We now show how the language-theoretic characterisations of BSP’s lead to a
decision procedure for checking whether a ﬁnite-state system satisﬁes a given
BSP. We ﬁrst introduce the necessary terminology, beginning with the required
notions in ﬁnite state automata.
A (ﬁnite-state) transition system over an alphabet ∆ is a structure of the
form T = (Q, s,−→), where Q is a ﬁnite set of states, s ∈ Q is the start
state, and −→⊆ Q × ∆ × Q is the transition relation. We write p
a
−→ q to
stand for (p, a, q) ∈−→, and use p
α
−→∗q to denote the fact that we have a
path labelled α from p to q in the underlying graph of the transition system
T . More precisely we deﬁne
α
−→∗ inductively by saying p

−→∗p for all p ∈ Q,
and p
αa
−→∗q whenever there exists r ∈ Q such that p
α
−→∗r and r
a
−→ q. The
language accepted (or generated) by the transition system T is deﬁned to be
L(T ) = {α ∈ ∆∗ | p
α
−→∗q for some q ∈ Q}.
A (ﬁnite state) automaton (FSA) over an alphabet ∆ is of the form A =
(Q, s,−→, F ) where (Q, s,−→) forms a transition system and F ⊆ Q is a set
of ﬁnal states. The language accepted by A is deﬁned to be L(A) = {α ∈
∆∗ | s
α
−→∗q for some q ∈ F}.
A transition system can thus be thought of as an automaton in which all
states are ﬁnal.
It will be convenient to make use of automata with -transitions. Here
the automaton is also allowed transitions of the form p

−→ q. The language
accepted by automata with -transitions is deﬁned similarly, except that the
 labels don’t contribute to the label of a path. -transitions don’t add the
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to the expressive power of automata, as one can give a language equivalent
automaton B for a given automaton with -transitions A by adding transitions
of the form p
a
−→ q whenever p
a
−→∗q in A, and then deleting the -transitions.
The class of languages accepted by FSA’s is termed the class of regular
languages. Regular languages are eﬀectively closed under intersection and
complementation. Moreover their language emptiness problem – i.e. given an
FSA A, is L(A) = ∅? – is eﬃciently decidable (by simply checking if there is
a ﬁnal state reachable from the initial state). It thus follows that the language
inclusion problem (whether L(A) ⊆ L(B)?) is also decidable for automata,
since we can check equivalently that L(A) ∩ (∆∗ − L(B)) = ∅.
Returning to our problem of verifying BSP’s, we say that a system mod-
elled as a ﬁnite-state transition system T satisﬁes a given BSP P iﬀ L(T )
satisﬁes P . In the previous section we showed that the question of whether a
language L satisﬁes P boils down to checking whether L1 ⊆ L2, where L1 and
L2 are obtained from L by successive applications of some language-theoretic
operations. If L is a regular language to begin with, and if each language-
theoretic operation op of section 2 is regularity preserving and eﬀectively so
(in the sense that if M is presented by an FSA then we can construct an
FSA that accepts op(M)), then L1 and L2 are also regular languages and the
question L1 ⊆ L2 can be eﬀectively answered. To give a decision procedure for
our BSP veriﬁcation problem, it is thus suﬃcient to show that the language-
theoretic operations are regularity preserving in the above sense. In the rest
of this section we concentrate on showing this.
The language operations of section 2 are of the following kinds: they either
take a language over Σ and return a language over Σ, or they take a language
over Σ and return a marked language over Σ, or they take a marked language
over Σ and return a marked language over Σ. In all cases we show that if they
take a regular language, they return a regular language.
(i) Projection wrt X. Let L be a language over Σ accepted by an FSA A, and
let X ⊆ Σ. Then we can construct A′ accepting LX by simply replacing
transitions of the form p
a
−→ q, with a 	∈ X, in A, by an -transition
p

−→ q.
(ii) l-del. Let L be a language over Σ, with L = L(A). We construct A′ for
l-del(L) as follows. We create two copies of A. The initial state of A′ is
the initial state of the ﬁrst copy. In the ﬁrst copy we add an -transition
from a state p in the ﬁrst copy to state q in the second copy if p
c
−→ q
in A, with c ∈ C. The ﬁnal states in the ﬁrst copy are marked non-ﬁnal
and the the ﬁnal states in the second copy are retained.
This construction can be described formally as follows. LetA = (Q, s,−→
, F ). Deﬁne A′ = (Q′, s′,−→′, F ′) where Q′ = Q×{1, 2}, s′ = (s, 1), −→′
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is given by
(p, 1)
a
−→′ (q, 1) if p
a
−→ q in A
(p, 1)

−→′ (q, 2) if p
c
−→ q in A with c ∈ C
(p, 2)
a
−→′ (q, 2) if p
a
−→ q and a 	∈ C,
and F ′ = F × {2}.
The construction is depicted in Fig. 1.

a a
c
Fig. 1. l-del(L)
(iii) l-ins. Let L be a language over Σ with L = L(A). We construct A′ for
l-ins(L) as follows. We make two copies of A. The start state of A′ is
the start state of the ﬁrst copy, and the ﬁnal states are the ﬁnal states of
the second copy. In the ﬁrst copy for every transition p
a
−→ q we add a
c transition (for every c ∈ C) from p in the ﬁrst copy to p in the second
copy. The c-transitions for c ∈ C are deleted from the second copy. The
construction is depicted in Fig 2.
c
a a
c
Fig. 2. l-ins(L)
(iv) l-ins-admX . Let L be a language over Σ with L = L(A), and let X ⊆ Σ.
We construct A′ for l-ins-admX(L) as follows. We have two “copies” of
A. In the ﬁrst copy, the states have two components: the ﬁrst component
keeps track of a state from A, while the second keeps track of a set of
states of A that are reachable by words that are X-equivalent to the
current word being read. We have a transition labelled c, with c ∈ C,
from a state (p, T ) in the ﬁrst copy to p in the second copy, provided T
contains a state t from which it is possible to do a c and reach a ﬁnal
state. Once in the second copy, we allow only non-C transitions and
retain the original ﬁnal states.
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More formally, we can deﬁne A′ as follows. Let A = (Q, s,−→, F ) and
let B be the automaton obtained from A by replacing transitions of the
form p
a
−→ q by p

−→ q whenever a 	∈ X. Then A′ = (Q′, s′,−→′, F ′)
where Q′ = (Q× 2Q) ∪Q; s′ = (s, S) where S = {q ∈ Q | s

−→∗q in B};
−→′ is given below:
(p, T )
a
−→′ (q, T ) if p
a
−→ q and a 	∈ X
(p, T )
a
−→′ (q, U) if p
a
−→ q, a ∈ X, and
U = {r | ∃t ∈ T, t
a
−→∗r in B}
(p, T )
c
−→′ p if ∃t ∈ T, q ∈ F : t
c
−→ q and c ∈ C;
p
a
−→′ q if a 	∈ C.
and F ′ = F .
c
Fig. 3. l-ins-admX(L)
(v) l-del-mark. This construction is similar to l-del except that the label of
the -transitions we add from the ﬁrst copy to the second, is now .
(vi) l-ins-mark. The construction is similar to l-ins. Here instead of inserting
a transition labelled c from the ﬁrst copy to the second, we need to insert
a transition labelled c from the ﬁrst copy to the second. This can be
carried out by having a third copy of A placed between the ﬁrst and
second. The third copy has all its transitions deleted, and all its states
are neither initial nor ﬁnal. A c transition from p in the ﬁrst copy now
goes to p in the third copy, and from p in the third copy we add a 
transition to p in the second copy.
(vii) l-ins-adm-markX . The construction is similar to l-ins-admX . Instead
of adding a c transition from the ﬁrst copy to the second, we add one
labelled c (once again this can be achieved using a third copy of A).
(viii) mark. Given A for L ⊆ Σ∗, we construct A′ which accepts the marked
language mark(L). A is obtained from A as follows. We again use two
copies of A. The initial state of A′ is the initial state of the ﬁrst copy,
and the ﬁnal states are only those of the second copy. From every state
in the ﬁrst copy we add a transition labelled  to the same state in the
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second copy.
(ix) Marked projection. Given a marked language M , an FSA A accepting M ,
and X ⊆ Σ, we construct A′ which accepts the marked language M mX .
Once again we use two copies of A. The initial state of the ﬁrst copy is
the initial state of A′ and the ﬁnal states of the second copy are the ﬁnal
states of A′. From the ﬁrst copy we delete transitions of the form p

−→ q
and add a transition labelled  from p in the ﬁrst copy to q in the second
copy. In the second copy, we replace transition labels which are not in X
by .

a 

Fig. 4. M mX
(x) l-del-con-mark. Let L be a language over Σ and A be an FSA accepting
L. Let C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ ⊆ V . We construct A′ accepting the marked
language l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L) as follows. We have four copies of A.
The second and third copies have all transitions deleted from them, and
the fourth copy has all C transitions deleted from it. The initial state of
the ﬁrst copy is the initial state of A′ and the ﬁnal states of the fourth
copy are the ﬁnal states of A′. For every transition p
c′
−→ q with c′ ∈ C ′,
we add an -transition from p in the ﬁrst copy to q in the second copy.
We add a v′-transition from a state r in the second copy to a state t in
the third copy iﬀ r
v′
−→ t, with v′ ∈ V ′, is a transition in A. Finally, we
add a -transition from each state u in the third copy to u in the fourth
copy.

a
c′
v′
a
v′
v′

Fig. 5. l-del-con-markC′,V ′(L)
(xi) l-ins-con-mark.
Let L be a language over Σ and A be an FSA accepting L. Let
C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ ⊆ V . We construct A′ accepting the marked language
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l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L) as follows. We have four copies of A. The second
and third copies have all transitions deleted from them, and the fourth
copy has all C transitions deleted from it. The initial state of the ﬁrst
copy is the initial state of A′ and the ﬁnal states of the fourth copy are
the ﬁnal states of A′. For every transition p
v′
−→ q with v′ ∈ V ′, we add
a c′-transition (for every c′ ∈ C ′) from p in the ﬁrst copy to q in the
second copy. We add a v′-transition from a state r in the second copy to
a state t in the third copy iﬀ r
v′
−→ t, with v′ ∈ V ′, is a transition in A.
Finally, we add a -transition from each state u in the third copy to u in
the fourth copy.
a
c
v′
a
v′
v′

c′
Fig. 6. l-ins-con-markC′,V ′(L)
(xii) l-ins-adm-con-markX . Let L be a language over Σ with L = L(A),
and let X ⊆ Σ. Let C ′ ⊆ C and V ′ ⊆ V . We construct A′ for
l-ins-adm-markX(C ′)V ′L as follows. We use four “copies” of A. The
ﬁrst copy is exactly the same as in l-ins-admX(L), where the states have
two components, the ﬁrst component keeping track of a state from A,
while the second keeps track of a set of states of A that are reachable
by words that are X-equivalent to the current word being read. The
second and third copies of A have all transitions deleted from them, and
the fourth copy has all C transitions deleted from it. The initial state of
the ﬁrst copy is the initial state of A′ and the ﬁnal states of the fourth
copy are the ﬁnal states of A′. We have a transition labelled c′, with
c′ ∈ C ′, from a state (p, T ) in the ﬁrst copy to p in the second copy,
provided T contains a state t from which it is possible to do a c′. We add
a v′-transition from a state r in the second copy to a state u in the third
copy iﬀ r
v′
−→ u, with v′ ∈ V ′, is a transition in A. Finally, we add a
-transition from each state w in the third copy to w in the fourth copy.
(xiii) erase-con-mark. Let L ⊆ Σ∗ and let A be an FSA with L = L(A). Let
N ′ ⊆ N and V ′ ⊆ V . We construct A′ accepting erase-con-markN ′,V ′(L)
as follows. We have four copies of A. The ﬁrst and fourth copy have
all their original transitions intact, the second has all transitions labeled
with a 	∈ N ′ deleted and transitions labelled n′, with n′ ∈ N ′, replaced
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c′
v′ v′
v′

Fig. 7. l-ins-adm-con-markXC′,V ′(L)
by -transitions; and the third has all its transitions deleted. We add an
-transition from every state p in the ﬁrst copy to p in the second copy;
For every state p in the second copy such that p
v′
−→ q in A, we add a
v′-transition from p in the second copy to q in the third copy. From every
state p in the third copy we add a transition labelled  to p in the fourth
copy. The initial states of A′ are the initial states of the ﬁrst copy and
the ﬁnal states those of the fourth copy.

a
n′
v′
a
n′
v′

v′ 
Fig. 8. erase-con-markN′,V ′(L)
5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated in this paper a way to automatically verify trace based
information ﬂow properties of ﬁnite state systems. We give characterisations
of the properties in terms of language-theoretic operations on the set of traces
of a system, rather than in terms of the structure of the system which is a
stronger notion. This perhaps explains why we are able to obtain complete
characterisations unlike the previous techniques in the literature.
The running time of our procedure can be seen to be exponential in the
number of states of the given ﬁnite state transition system, in the worst case.
This is because the automata constructions for the language-theoretic opera-
tions involve a blow-up in states of O(n) in most cases, and 2O(n) in the case
of the BSP’s based on the admissibility clause (here n is the number of states
in the given transition system). Furthermore, no operation used on the right
hand side of the containment (recall that our characterisations are typically
of the form op1(L) ⊆ op2(L)) introduces an exponential blow-up. Thus in
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checking containment, we have to complement an automaton of size at most
O(n), and thus we have a bound of 2O(n) in the worst case.
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